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ABSTRACT 
The current study examined the role of rumination, or self-focused attention on one's 
thoughts and feelings, on triggered displaced aggression. Ruminating about a 
provocation is expected to maintain an aggressive. internal state, which disposes 
individuals to act aggressively in ambiguously provoking situations by leading to the 
interpretation of minor annoyances as provoking, and deserving of an aggressive 
.retaliation. Being distracted from thinking about a provocation is expected to abate a 
provocation-induced aggressive internal state, thus reducing displaced aggression. 
In the current study, participants were either provoked by interacting with an insulting 
experimenter and engaging in a difficult task, or not provoked by interacting with a 
pleasant experimenter and engaging in an easy task. Participants were then induced 
to ruminate about their experience, or were distracted from thinking about it. Half of 
the participants then received a mildly negative evaluation (trigger) from a partner, or 
a neutral evaluation (no trigger). As expected, provoked participants who ruminated 
were more aggressive against atriggering target than a nontriggering target. The 
presence or absence of a triggering event had no effect on provoked participants 
who were distracted, or nonprovoked participants. Negative perceptions of the 
triggering event mediated the relationship between trigger and displaced aggression 
for provoked participants who ruminated, but did not serve as a mediator for -other 
participants. The results of the current study suggest that ruminating about a 
provocation disposes individuals to interpret mild annoyances as provoking and 
warranting an aggressive response. When prevented from thinking about a 
vii
provocation, individuals do not interpret mild annoyances as provo-king enough to 
warrant an aggressive response. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Carol, a college student, spent several weeks preparing a class presentation. 
After her presentation, her professor harshly criticizes her performance, suggesting 
.that she was ill-prepared. Carol silently fumes about her professor's comments the 
rest of the day. When she returns to her apartment that afternoon, she finds that her 
roommate left dirty dishes in the sink. Carol turns to her roommate, and screams at 
.her for being a slob. 
Displaced Aggression 
Aggression sometimes follows a straightforward series of steps. That is, an 
individual is provoked by someone, and in retaliation, inflicts harm against the 
provoking individual. This type of aggression is defined as direct aggression, or 
aggression directed towards a provoking agent (Geen, 2001). However, the target of 
aggression is not always a provoking individual. Rather, the target is an innocent 
person, or a person who has only committed a mildly annoying offense. Aggression 
that is directed towards individuals other than the provoking agent is defined as 
displaced aggression (Geen, 2001). 
The scientific study of displaced aggression stems from the tenants of the-
frustration aggression hypothesis developed by D011ard and colleagues (Dollard, 
Doob, Miller, Mowrer, &Sears, 1939). In brief, the frustration-aggression hypothesis 
argues that frustration produces an instigation, or disposition, to aggress. Frustration 
is defined as any act or event that impedes the attainment of a goal. I n its most 
rudimentary form, the frustration-aggression hypothesis argued that aggression is 
2 
always preceded by some form of frustration, and aggression is always a 
consequence of frustration, though contemporary psychologists have rejected the 
absolutism of this argument (teen, 2001). Displaced aggression was a corollary to 
the original frustration-aggression hypothesis. Dollard and colleagues (1939) argued 
that aggression served to reduce frustration. They argued -that when frustrated, 
individuals are in an aggressive state, and .aggression will follow. Displaced 
aggression is thought to occur because direct aggression against a frustrating agent 
is not possible, and therefore, as a substitute, aggression is aimed at a seemingly 
innocuous person. 
Though directly aggressing against a provoker (a frustrating agent) seems 
logical, there are three circumstances when such behavior is impossible or unwise 
(Miller, 1941). First, the provoking agent may be unavailable. For example, the 
provoker could leave before retaliation is possible. Second, the provoking agent may 
be an intangible entity, such as hot temperatures, foul odors, or air pollution 
(Anderson, Anderson, Door, DeNeve, &Flanagan, 2000; Baron &Bell, 1975; 
Konecini & Doob, 1972, Rotton, Barry, Frey, &Soler, 1978). Third, direct aggression 
against a provoker may be unwise because it would prompt subsequent retaliation 
or punishment. For example, the provoker could have power over the individual, 
such as a boss. Because aggression is not possible in any. of the aforementioned 
situations, aggression that would be directed towards the aggressor is, instead, 
directed towards an available and unthreatening target. 
The notion of displaced aggression certainly seems intuitively appealing, and 
applicable to many instances of "real life" aggression, such as the aggression 
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described in the opening vignette. However, despite its intuitive appeal, interest in 
experimental research on displaced aggression was not always abundant. Though 
the formation. of the frustration-aggression hypothesis spawned an initial wave of 
.research on displaced aggression, interest waned in the past few decades. Also, 
content analysis of recent social psychology textbooks suggests a lack of confidence 
in the reliability of displaced aggression findings (Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, 
Carlson, &Miller, 2000). However, a recent meta-analysis by .Marcus-Newhall and 
colleagues (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2000) suggests that displaced aggression is a 
reliable phenomenon, producing effects that are moderate (d+= +.55) in size 
(Cohen, 1988). 
Triggered Displaced Aggression 
In early studies, displaced aggression was conceptualized as aggression 
directed towards a nonprovoking agent. In traditional displaced aggression 
paradigms, participants are initially provoked, and then allowed to aggress against a 
completely innocent, nonprovoking, third-person. However, such studies fail to 
capture all instances of displaced aggression. Often times, the target of displaced 
aggression is not completely innocent. As the opening vignette indicates, the target 
of displaced aggression might commit a mildly annoying act. This type of displaced 
aggression is called triggered displaced aggression (Dollard, 1938). Triggered 
displaced aggression involves two phases of provocation.. That is, after an initial 
provocation, the target of displaced aggression commits a minor provocation, called 
a triggering event, that elicits an aggressive retaliation. Thus, with triggered 
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displaced aggression, the individual is provoked twice: once by the initial provoking 
agent (e.g., an insulting professor) and once by the target of _aggression (e.g., the 
messy roommate). Miller and Marcus-Newhall (1997) argue that triggered displaced 
aggression has more ecological validity than non-triggered displaced aggression 
because it is more representative of "real life" occurrences of displaced aggression. 
An interesting characteristic of triggered displaced aggression is that it seems 
to violate traditional norms that govern social interactions. According to the matching 
rule (Axelrod, 1982), social interactions often follow atit-for-tat exchange. In some 
cases of triggered displaced aggression, individuals do not adhere to the tit-for-tat 
matching rule (Miller & Marcus-Newhall, 1997). The combination of an initial Time 1 
provocation and a Time 2 triggering event synergistically combine to elicit a 
disjunctively augmented aggressive response directed towards the triggering 
individual (Miller & Marcus-Newhall, 1997). Miller and Marcus-Newhall (1997) define 
a disjunctively augmented response as an aggressive response directed towards the 
triggering target that exceeds what would be expected based on atit-for-tat 
exchange. That is, the aggressive response directed towards the triggering target 
exceeds what is expected based on the intensity of the triggering event. 
An important caveat is that the intensity of the triggering event must be minor 
in comparison to the initial provocation in order to observe a disjunctively augmented 
aggressive response (Miller & Marcus-Newhall, 1997; Pedersen et al., 2000). Minor 
triggering events are more ambiguous with respect to provocation and intentionality 
than are strong triggering events. In the absence of the initial Time 1 provocation, a 
mild Time 2 triggering event might not be judged as provocative. However, a strong 
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initial provocation might prime individuals to more readily notice these ambiguous 
triggering events and perceive them as intentional-and provoking (Duncan, 1976; 
Higgins &King, 1981). Therefore, the aggressive retaliation directed towards the 
tri Bring target would exceed that which is expected if the ambiguous trigger gg 
occurred in the absence of an initial provocation. In contrast, strong Time 2 
triggering events are likely to be less ambiguous with respect to provocation and 
. intentionality than are mild triggering events. Therefore, even in the absence of an 
initial provocation, strong triggering events are likely perceived as provoking, and the 
aggressive retaliation is expected. 
According to Pedersen and colleagues (Pedersen et al., 2000), one problem 
with most of the initial work, albeit limited, on triggered displaced aggression is that 
the intensity of the Time 2 triggering event at least equaled, if not exceeded, the 
intensity of the initial Time 1 provocation (e.g., Baron &Bell, 1975; Carver &Glass, 
1978; Geen &Berkowitz, 1967; &Worchel, 1966). For example, in Worchel's (1966) 
study, the initial provocation was the announcement of a pop quiz, and the trigger 
was an aggravating insult. In Baron and Bell's (1975) study, the initial provocation 
was working in a hot and humid room, and the trigger was an insulting confederate. 
I n both the Worchel (1966) and Baron and Bell (1975) studies, the triggering event 
was likely just as provoking as the initial provocation. In both cases, the results 
suggest that the interaction between provocation and trigger did not occur. That is, 
the level of displaced aggression directed towards the triggering target was a 
function of the additive, not interactive, combination of the provocation and the 
triggering events. 
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Recently, however, two studies have successfully examined the interactive 
effect between a strong initial provocation. and a subsequent mild triggering event 
(Pedersen et al., 2000). I n one study the initial provocation was manipulated by 
having individuals interact with an insulting (provocation) or pleasant (no 
provocation) experimenter. At Time 2, participants interacted with a confederate who 
was either incompetent (trigger) or competent (no trigger). As desired, the triggering 
event was perceived as less aversive than the initial provocation. As expected, 
previously provoked participants engaged in more displaced aggression in the 
presence of a triggering event than in its absence. Without an initial provocation, 
however, the presence or absence of a triggering event had no effect on displaced 
aggression indicating that the triggering event was in fact minor. Furthermore, 
mediation analyses suggest that negative feelings about the triggering event 
mediated the relationship between the triggering event and subsequent displaced 
aggression. Among. provoked participants, the minor triggering event generated 
unpleasant feelings, such as anger. These negative feelings, in turn, prompted an 
aggressive retaliation against the triggering target. 
The results of the Pedersen et a1. (2000) studies suggest that an initial 
provocation _disposes individuals to react negatively to events, which under normal 
circumstances would not produce an aversive state. In turn, this negative reaction to 
seemingly innocuous events prompts an aggressive retaliation that is excessive 
based on the low provocation level of the event. Thus, a negative internal state 
appears to be responsible for displaced aggression effects. The General Aggression 
Model (GAM, Anderson &Bushman, 2002x) provides a theoretical explanation for 
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how an initial provocation could produce an internal state that disposes individuals to 
behave aggressively in the presence of a subsequent minor triggering event. 
The General Aggression Model and Triggered Displaced Aggression 
According to Anderson. and Bushman (2002x), one problem in the aggression 
domain is that hypotheses are derived based on several microtheories of 
a ression. Such theories include excitation transfer theory (Zillmann, 1971, 1979), gg 
social learning theory (Bandura, 1973), and cognitive neoassociation theory 
(Berkowitz, 1993), among others. The General Aggression Model (GAM; Anderson 
& Bushman, 2002x) seeks, in part, to integrate various microtheories of aggression 
into a single model. The model describes amulti-stage process by which person and 
situation input variables lead to aggressive behavior in a short-term time frame.- They 
do so by influencing several related internal states, and the outcomes of automatic 
and controlled appraisal (or decision) processes. Figure 1 presents a schematic of 
GAM . 
Any given aggression episode begins with. certain inputs. Some of these 
inputs are person inputs including personality traits (e.g., trait aggressiveness, 
hostile attribution biases, and narcissism), and positive attitudes towards aggression, 
among others, which are associated with aggressive behavior (Bushman 
Baumeister, 1998, Crick &Dodge, 1994, Dill et al., 1997; Huesmann &Guerra,. 
1997). In addition to person inputs, situation inputs can also affect aggressive 
outcomes. For example, provocation and exposure to aggressive cues (e.g., violent 
Inputs 
Routes 
Outcomes 
Present internal state: 
Affect 
•• • •. 
Cognition - • - - - ~trousa! 
Appraisal & 
decision 
processes 
Social 
encounter 
 J 
Thoughtful 
action 
mpulsive 
action 
Figure 1. The General Aggression Model (Anderson &Bushman, 2002a) 
media) increases the likelihood of aggressive responding (Anderson &Bushman, 
2002b; Geen, 2001). 
The relationship between personal and situational inputs and aggressive 
outcomes is not direct, but rather mediated through the present internal state of the 
individual, namely the affective, arousal, and cognitive states (Anderson &Bushman 
2002b). For example, being provoked can increase physiological arousal, which 
could produce an aggressive response, either directly or indirectly through 
misattributed arousal (Zillmann, 1971, 1979). Likewise, being provoked also 
produces negative affective states such as feelings of anger and hostility (Anderson 
& Bushman, 2002x). Finally, personological and situational inputs can produce 
changes in an individual's cognitive state, such as by increasing hostile cognitions 
and activating aggressive behavioral scripts, which, in turn, can produce aggressive 
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behavior (Anderson &Bushman, 2002b; Berkowtiz, 1993; Huesmann, 1998}. As can 
be seen by the dashed lines in Figure 1, these present internal states do not act in 
isolation, but. rather influence, and are influenced, by each other. For example, 
negative affective states, such as anger, can produce increases in physiological 
arousal, and in the accessibility of aggressive cognitions (Berkowitz, 1993). 
The relationship between an individual's present internal state and a given 
outcome is mediated. by appraisal and decision making processes. The first phase in 
the decision making process is an immediate appraisal. Decisions based on 
immediate appraisals are made automatically, with little cognitive processing. If there 
are insufficient cognitive resources to process the appraisal further, or a lack of 
interest in the outcome, then the immediate appraisal is the final appraisal. Such an 
appraisal process results in an impulsive action (e.g., hostile aggression). However, 
if cognitive resources are sufficient, and there is interest in the outcome, 
reappraisals of internal sates are made, which produces thoughtful actions (e.g., 
instrumental aggression). 
One can use the tenants of GAM (Anderson &Bushman, 2002x) to explain 
triggered displaced aggression effects. Triggered displaced aggression first begins 
with a strong provocation, which is a situational input. This provocation creates 
changes in an individual's present arousal, affective, and cognitive internal states. 
The provocation could heighten physiological arousal, and . increase angry affect and 
aggressive cognitions. The increases in physiological arousal, aggressive affect, and 
aggressive cognitions could affect the appraisal and decision processes individuals 
make for other people's ..behavior. That is, if a provoked individual encounters a 
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person who commits a slightly annoying offense, they might interpret that offense as 
provoking, and retaliate with an aggressive response. Moreover, GAM puts no time 
frame on how long an aggressive internal state can persist. It could persist for 
minutes, or perhaps days. Thus, one could use GAM to explain displaced 
aggression findings that occur long after the initial provocation, which is 
characteristic of many instances of "real life" displaced aggression. 
In the Pedersen et al. (2000) studies, the Time 2 triggering event occurred 
immediately after the initial provocation. Indeed, in most research to date, the 
temporal gap between the initial provocation and the displaced aggression 
opportunity rarely, if ever, has exceeded 10 minutes. This is not surprising, 
considering most of these studies were conceptualized under an excitation transfer 
framework ~(Zillmann, 1971, 1979), where physiological arousal was expected to 
persist for about 10 minutes after the termination of the arousing event (Doob & 
Climie, 1972; Fridhandler & Averill, 1982; Tyson, 1998). However, in order for 
triggered displaced aggression to have broad, ecologically valid explanatory power, 
underlying processes that can persist across a substantial delay between the 
provocation and displaced aggression opportunity are required. In essence, what is 
needed in displaced aggression research is to identify processes that could maintain 
aggressive internal states.. One cognitive process that could sustain an aggressive 
internal state over an extended period of time between provocation and the triggered 
displaced aggression opportunity is rumination. 
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Triggered Ruminative Aggression 
In prior aggression research, rumination has been conceptualized as a 
personological variable, and defined as a tendency to harbor negative feelings 
elicited by provocations over an extended period of time (Caprara, 1986; Caprara, 
Barbaranelli, & Comrey, 1992). Correlational research suggests that individuals 
prone to rumination are more aggressive than individuals less prone to rumination 
(Caprara, 1986; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Colombo, Politi, & Valerio, 1.985; Caprara et 
al., 1992; Caprara, Cinanni, &Mazzoni, 1989; Caprara, Gargaro, Pastorelli, & 
Prezza, 1987; Caprara, Mazzoni, Zeili, Coluzzi, &Renzi, 1985; Collins &Bell, 1992). 
In fact, individuals prone to rumination show heightened aggression towards a 
provoker even if the provocation occurred 24-hours before the aggression 
opportunity (Caprara et al., 1985). 
Rumination can also be conceptualized as a situational variable, defined as 
self-focused attention on one's thoughts and feelings (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995). Ruminating about an event can maintain negative feelings 
elicited by that event (Martin & Tesser, 1989). For example, self-focused attention is 
associated with increases in both depressive and angry affect (Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991; Rusting &Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). For example, Rusting & Nolen-
Hoeksema (1998), told participants they would engage in tasks related to 
imagination and dreaming. For the first task, participants were angered by reading a 
story about a professor unfairly treating a student, and participants were instructed 
to imagine they were that student. Some participants were then induced to ruminate 
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by writing about self-focused topics (e.g., "why do others treat you as they do"), 
whereas other participants wrote about irrelevant topics (e.g., "the layout of the local 
post office"). Participants who ruminated for 8 minutes reported being angrier than 
those who were distracted. 
There is little research examining the role of induced rumination on 
aggressive behavior. One study (Konecni, _1974) found that preventing individuals 
from ruminating reduced direct aggression towards an insulting confederate. 
Recently, two studies (Bushman, Pedersen, Vasquez, Bonacci, &Miller, 2003) have 
examined the role of rumination directly on triggered displaced aggression. In Study 
1,participants were provoked by an insulting experimenter and a poor performance 
on a verbal task. Next, participants were induced to either ruminate or not ruminate 
for 25 minutes using the same rumination procedure in the Rusting and Nolen- 
Hoeksema (1998) study. Participants in the trigger condition then encountered a 
fumbling, though not insulting, confederate; participants in the no trigger condition 
encountered a competent confederate. Provoked participants who ruminated before 
the triggering event displayed more displaced aggression towards the fumbling 
confederate than participants who did not ruminate.. In Study 2, participants were 
insulted by writing an essay, anal receiving a strongly negative evaluation from an 
ostensible partner. Participants in the rumination condition were told to return 8 
hours later, and that they would have to defend their poor performance on the essay 
to another person. Participants in the no rumination condition were also told to return 
8 hours later, but were told their second partner would not see their essay or the 
evaluation of their essay. During the second session, participants completed a 
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verbal task. In the trigger condition, participants received a mildly negative 
evaluation of their performance from their second partner, whereas participants in 
the no trigger condition received a neutral evaluation. The findings from Study 2 
replicated those of Study 1; provoked participants who received a mildly negative 
evaluation were more aggressive. if they ruminated then if they were distracted. 
Current Study 
The purpose of the current study was to further clarify the effect of rumination 
on triggered displaced aggression. One criticism of the Bushman et al. (2003) 
studies is that they did not include no provocation conditions; all participants were 
provoked. Because the absence of provocation yields null triggered displaced 
aggression effects, it was assumed to produce null effects under either rumination or 
distraction conditions. However, such a conclusion cannot be drawn unless 
provocation is manipulated in the experimental design. Another criticism is that the 
Bushman et al. studies (2003) presented no evidence of cognitive processes that 
could mediate the relationship between rumination and triggered displaced 
aggression. It was suggested that rumination increases triggered displaced 
aggression because it maintains an aggressive affective and cognitive state that 
disposes individuals to behave aggressively under mildly provoking conditions. 
Mediational support is needed to test the validity of this hypothesis. 
The purpose of the current study was to replicate and extend the findings of 
the Bushman et al. (2003) studies. There are three primary differences between the 
current study and the Bushman et al. (2003) studies. First, the presence or absence 
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of an initial provocation was manipulated. Second, the operational definitions of 
rumination and distraction were designed to be more ecologically valid. Rumination 
participants were asked to write specifically about the provocation whereas 
distraction participants wrote about an irrelevant topic. Finally, perceptions of how 
negatively individuals perceived the triggering event were assessed, and used as a 
potential mediator between rumination and displaced aggression.. 
In the current study, participants were first provoked by an insulting 
experimenter and a difficult verbal task, or not provoked by a neutral experimenter 
and a simple verbal task. Participants were then induced to ruminate by writing 
about their reactions to the experiment, or were distracted by writing about the. 
campus layout. After the writing activity, participants received either a mildly 
negative (trigger) or neutral (no trigger) evaluation of their verbal task performance 
from their partner. Participants were then given the opportunity to engage in 
displa ed aggression against their partner. Perceptions of the negativity of the 
triggering even were also assessed. 
Under conditions of no provocation, rumination was hypothesized to have no 
effect on triggered displaced aggression. Under conditions of provocation, 
rumination was expected to increase displaced aggression in the presence of a 
triggering event, but not in the absence of one. Finally, negative perceptions of the 
trigger were expected to mediate the relationship between rumination and triggered 
displaced aggression. That is, for participants who were provoked and ruminate 
about that provocation, the presence of a triggering event was expected to yield 
negative perceptions of the triggering event (e.g., the trigger was seen as 
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provoking). These negative perceptions of the trigger, in turn, were expected to 
increase displaced aggression. No mediational effects were expected for 
unprovoked participants, or provoked participants who did not ruminate. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 385 students (194 females, 191 males) enrolled in 
undergraduate psychology courses from a large, midwestern university.. They 
received extra course credit in exchange for their voluntary participation. Due to 
outlying data, 38 participants were dropped from the study. Thus, the final sample 
size was 347 participants (186 females, 161 males). 
Design 
The study was a 2 (male vs. female) x 2 (provocation vs. no provocation) x 2 
(rumination vs. distraction) x 2 (trigger vs. no trigger) between-subjects factorial 
design. 
Procedure 
Participants .arrived at the lab under the ruse they were participating in an 
impression formation study with a same sex partner. After obtaining informed 
consent, participants were told that they would engage in several tasks that would. 
help them form an impression of their partner. The experimenter emphasized that 
participants would never interact face-to-face with their partner, but would exchange 
correspondences via the experimenter. 
Participants were told one activity involved tasting food, which would give 
them an idea of the types of food their partner liked. Participants were given a "Food 
Preference Form" and told that they and their partner would each taste and evaluate 
a given food item on that form. Participants then rated how much they liked certain 
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types of food (e.g., dairy food, snack food, seafood, spicy food). Listed with each 
food category were two or three exemplars (e.g., hot sauce and curry for spicy food; 
crackers, chips, and pretzels for snack food). Ratings (e.g., I like spicy food) were 
made on a 21-point scale with -10 being strongly disagree and +10 being strongly 
agree. Greater agreement indicated greater liking for the food type. 
The experimenter informed participants that the next activity involved 
assessing verbal skills. Participants were given 15 anagrams to unscramble. All 
participants saw a series of scrambled letters presented on a computer screen for 5 
sec. The scrambled letters were then erased from the screen, and participants 
received a prompt to solve the anagram by writing the correct solution on an answer 
sheet and by saying the answer aloud over an intercom. They had 7 sec. to both 
write and say their solution aloud. Next, participants were shown the solution and 
asked to give the solution in afirst-person sentence. Participants were told to say 
their sentence over the intercom. They were given 5 seconds to generate and speak 
their sentence before the next series of scrambled letters appeared. The 
experimenter emphasized that participants must say the solution and sentence 
loudly and clearly because the experimenter would be in another room recording 
their solutions and sentences. 
The actual purpose of the anagram task was t~ provoke or not provoke 
participants. Participants in the provocation condition were subjected to three 
aggravations. First, the experimenter played load and distracting background music, 
Holst's Mars, the Bringer of I~Var, while participants were completing the anagram 
task. The ostensible purpose of the background music was to drown out hallway 
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noise. Second, the anagrams participants were asked. to solve were difficult (e.g., 
ELUNANTEI for LIEUTENANT, DMMPAIUNNEO for PANDEMONIUM). Third, the 
experimenter interrupted, and rudely insulted, the participant three times during the 
anagram task. After the fourth anagram, the experimenter said, via the intercom, 
"Look, I can bare) - hear ou. I need you to speak louder please." After the eighth 
y y 
anagram, the experimenter said, in a louder and angrier tone, "Hey, I still need you 
to speak louder please!" After the twelfth anagram, the experimenter .said in a loud, 
frustrated, and exacerbated tone, "Look, this is the third time I've had to say this! 
Can't ou follow directions? Speak louder!" The experimenter's insults were not Five, 
y 
but rather prerecorded and played over the intercom system. This provocation 
procedure has been successfully used in other displaced .aggression studies (e.g., 
Bushman et al., 2003; Pederson et al., 2000). 
Participants in the no provocation condition had a more pleasant experience 
during the anagram task. First, though they also listened to background music, it 
was softer and less harsh (Handle's Water Music). Second, they were given simpler 
anagrams to solve (e.g., ESTT for TEST, FSEEH for FLESH). Third, they were not 
insulted by the experimenter. After the participant completed the fourth, eighth, and 
twelfth anagrams, the experimenter simply said "You have just completed the fourth 
(eighth, twelfth) anagram," respectively. 
After participants completed the last anagram, they were prompted to turn off 
the background music. The experimenter took the participants' anagram solution 
sheet and said that later they would exchange solution sheets with their partner for 
evaluation. Participants were told the next activity involved writing an essay. 
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Participants in the rumination condition were told a professor, unrelated to the study, 
was interested in learning about participants' perceptions of the. research process.. 
The professor was asking research participants to write an essay about their 
experiences as a research participant. Participants were instructed to write about 
what they had done from the start of the study until the present time, and their 
thoughts and feelings they experienced. They were also told to write about the 
individuals they encountered in the study, and their thoughts .and feelings they had 
towards those individuals. It should be noted that the only individual participants had 
interacted with was the experimenter. Participants were told they would have 20 
minutes to write their essay, and should spend the entire 20 minutes writing it. 
Participants in the distraction condition were also told they would write an 
essay for a professor conducting a study unrelated to the one the participants were 
in. The professor was supposedly studying visual maps, and was asking research 
participants to write essays about the layout of the college campus. Participants 
were instructed to create a mental map of the campus and describe what they saw 
They were to write about the various buildings; the purpose of the various buildings; 
the landscape architecture of the campus; and the spatial relations (e.g., location of 
buildings) on campus. Distracted participants were also told to spend 20 minutes 
writing their essay. 
After completing their essay, the experimenter returned with the anagram 
solution sheet supposedly completed by the participant's partner. The experimenter 
instructed participants to examine the solutions, and evaluate their partners' 
performance. Participants believed their partner was evaluating their performance on 
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the anagram task. If the participant was in the provocation condition, the partner 
solved the difficult anagrams; if participant was in the no provocation condition, then 
the partner solved the easy anagrams. For all participants, the partner correctly 
unscrambled all the anagrams the participant did, plus three more. If the participant 
had fewer than three incorrect solutions, then the partner correctly solved all the 
anagrams, which happened seven percent of the time. Participants evaluated their 
partner's overall performance.on the task; the concentration level used by their 
partner; and the likelihood their partner would succeed in a class requiring good 
verbal skills. Ratings were made ~on a 21-point scale with-10 being unacceptable 
and +10 being acceptable. 
After completing the evaluation for their. partner, the experimenter returned 
with the partner's evaluation of the participant's anagram performance. Participants 
in the trigger condition received a slightly negative evaluation. The evaluation 
consisted of three items, plus room for written comments. They received scores of a 
-2 for overall performance; -1 for concentration level; and -1 for success in a class 
requiring good verbal skills. The partner also provided a written comment; "Although 
the task was difficult, I would have thought a college [class standing of the 
participant] would have performed better." Participants in the no trigger condition 
received a slightly positive evaluation of their anagram performance. They received 
ratings of +2 for overall performance; +1 for concentration level; and +1 for success 
in a class requiring good verbal skills. The partner also provided the written 
comment "Although the task was difficult, I thought my partner did a fairly good job 
for a college [class standing of the participant]." 
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The next phase of the study served as the displaced aggression opportunity, 
and is adapted from Lieberman et al.'s (1999) procedure. After the participant 
finished reading the evaluation, the experimenter returned with the partner's "Food 
Preference Form." Participants were told to examine the form, and see what types of 
food their partner did and did not like to eat. They also were told that next that they 
would sample one of the items on the list. For all participants, their partner indicated 
_they liked most of the foods listed. However, the partner indicated a strong dislike, -9 
on a -10 to +10 scale, of spicy foods. The partner also provided the written 
comment, "I like most of the foods listed above, but I hate spicy foods." 
The experimenter then returned with a box containing a 3.5 oz. Dixietm cup, a 
container of hot sauce, a lid, two spoons, and a cup of water. The hot sauce was a 
mixture of 5 oz. of Melinda's Original Habornaro Pepper Sauce X~JC HOT brand hot 
sauce combined with 12 oz. of Heinz Chile Sauce. Participants were told they were 
randomly assigned to eat pretzels, and their partner was randomly assigned to eat 
hot sauce. They were also told their partner would decide how many pretzels they 
would consume, and they would decide how much hot sauce their- partner would 
consume. The experimenter emphasized that they, and their partner, would be 
required to consume the entire food product that they were given. Participants were 
then given a chance to sample the hot sauce, so they understood how spicy it was. 
They were given water to drink if it was too spicy. The experimenter then instructed 
participants to spoon as much hot sauce they wanted their partner to consume into 
the cup. Participants were also told to place a lid on the cup so the experimenter did 
not know how much hot sauce the participants put in the cup. After the participant 
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finished the hot sauce allocation procedure, the experimenter took the cup away, 
and returned shortly with a cup of pretzels for the participant to eat. The participant 
then rated how much they liked eating the pretzels. 
Participants also evaluated their perception of the triggering event —the 
evaluation their partner gave their anagram performance. We predicted that these 
perceptions would mediate the effect of the trigger on displaced aggression, 
especially among angered participants who ruminated about the provocation. 
Participants rated the evaluation based on how angry it made them; how much it 
bothered them; if it was overly critical; if it was harsh; and if it was nasty. Ratings 
were made on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) point scale. Several 
other items were added as fillers. The items.-were standardized and summed to yield 
an overall composite score of how negatively participants perceived the evaluation. 
Higher scores indicateda more negative perception of the anagram evaluation. The 
scale showed good. internal consistency, with a coefficient alpha of .88. To control 
for order effects, half of the participants completed the evaluation perception 
measure before allocating hot sauce to their partner, and half the participants 
allocated hot sauce to their partner before completing the evaluation perception 
measure. 
At this point, the experiment was terminated. Participants were then probed 
for suspicion. Participants were asked if anything seemed suspicious about the 
study. If the participant indicated suspicion, the experimenter probed further to 
discern when the participant became suspicious and why. The experimenter then 
fully debriefed the participants by explaining that the study was not about forming 
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impressions, but rather about displaced aggression. Participants were allowed to ask 
the experimenter questions about the study, and provide comments about their 
experience being a participant and being deceived. Finally, the participants were 
thanked and asked not to inform other potential participants about the true purpose 
of the study. 
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RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Statistical assumptions. Tukey's (1977) box plot was used to identify 
potential outliers in the primary dependant variable —the amount of hot sauce 
allocated to the ostensible partner. Because outlying data can unduly influence least 
squares estimates, extreme outliers were removed from data set (Barnett &Lewis, 
1978). An extreme outlier was defined as allocating more than 25 grams of hot 
sauce. Removing the extreme outliers left a total sample size of 347 participants 
(186 females, 161 males). Of the 38 outliers removed, there were 8 outliers in the 
provocation-rumination-trigger condition, 3 outliers in the. provocation-rumination-no 
trigger condition, 6 outliers in the provocation-distraction-trigger condition, 3 outliers 
in the provocation-distraction-no trigger condition, 5 outliers in the no provocation- 
rumination-trigger condition, 1 outlier in the no provocation-distraction-no trigger 
condition, 8 outliers in the no provocation-distraction-trigger condition, and 3 outliers 
in the no provocation-distraction-no trigger condition. In order to run .Fisher's exact 
tests, the groups were collapsed across provocation into two 4 (treatment condition) 
X 2 {outlier, no outlier) tables. The Fisher's .exact tests could not detect any 
differences in the probability of an outlier occurring in any of the groups (ps > .05). 
Since outlying data appeared to be unrelated to condition, participants with outlying 
data were dropped form the sample. Descriptive statistics for the reduced data set 
are presented in Table 1 (hot sauce allocation) and Table 2 (perceived negativity of 
the triggering event). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for hot sauce allocation (grams) for the reduced data 
set 
Group n Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Skewness Kurtosis 
All groups 347 2.70 g 0.19 g 1.10 g 1.56 2.94 
Group 1 37 5.39 g 0.74 g 4.70 g 0.95 0.32 
Provocation 
Rumination 
Trigger 
Group 2 41 2.32 g 0.54 g 0.60 g 1.52 1..99 
Provocation 
Distraction 
Trigger 
Group 3 40 2.81 g 0.46 g 1.80 g 1.00 -0.15 
Provocation 
Rumination 
No trigger 
Group 4 47 
- _ _ 
2.7 g 
__ _.. __ 
0,44 g 
_ ___--- --_ 
1.60 g 1.07 0.01 
Provocation 
---D-s~racton - ___ - ---- 
No trigger 
Group 5 42 2.41 g 0.49 g 0.80 g 1.50 1.73 
No provocation 
Rumination 
Trigger 
Group 6 49 1.78 g 0.41 g 0.60 g 2.32 5.40 
No provocation 
Distraction 
Trigger 
Group 7 43 2.56 g 0.64 g 0,80 g 2.15 _4.62 
No provocation 
Rumination 
No Trigger 
Group 8 48 2.19 g 0.45 g 1.00 g 2.51 4.52 
No provocation 
Distraction 
Trigger 
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Tabie 2. Descriptive statistics for perceived negativity of the triggering event 
(standardized score) for the reduced data set 
Group n Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Skewness Kurtosis 
All groups 339 -0.001 0.22 -0.59 0.54 -0.42 
Group 1 37 3.51 0.77 3.77 -0.22 -0.58 
Provocation 
Rumination 
Trigger 
Group 2 41 -1.59 0.59 -3.03 1.31 2.03 
Provocation 
Distraction 
Trigger 
Group 3 37 2.23 0.53 1.87 -0.71 -0.18 
Provocation 
Rumination 
No trigger 
Group 4 46 
__ 
_ 
-1.12 0.53 -2.07 
__ 
1.04 
____ - - - __ 
-0.54 
_ _--- __ _._ _. __---
Provocation 
-- 
- ---- ----- is racoon _ _ - 
No trigger 
Group 5 40 0.36 0.60 0.80 0.21 -0.78 
No provocation 
Rumination 
Trigger 
Group 6 47 -2.00 0.51 -3.40 0.84 -0.72 
No provocation 
Distraction 
Trigger 
Group 7 43 2.02 0.62 1.81 0.41 -0.60 
No provocation 
Rumination 
No Trigger 
Group 8 47 -2.02 0.36 -2.20 0.28 -1.18 
No provocation 
Distraction 
Trigger 
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order effects. Recall that half of the participants allocated hot sauce to their 
partner before completing their perception of the evaluation, and half of the 
participants completed their perception of the evaluation before allocating- hot sauce 
to their partner. The order in which participants completed the dependent measures 
did not have a main effect on aggression, F(1, 314) = 2.76, p > .05, or perceived 
negativity of the. triggering event, F(1, 305) = 3.64, p > .05. Moreover, the order of 
dependent measures did not interact with provocation, trigger, and rumination for 
both aggression and perceived negativity of the triggering event, all ps > .05. Since 
order of dependent measures had no effects on either dependent variable, order of 
dependent measures was dropped from the model. 
Primary Analyses 
- Tie data wer-e anaayz~d using a-2 (male us. females x2 (pro_vocat on vs. no 
provocation) x 2 (rumination vs. distraction) x 2 (trigger vs. no trigger) between- 
subjects factorial design. 
Sex differences. There was a significant main effect for sex, with, overall, 
males being mare. aggressive than females, F(1, 331) = 5.09, p < .05, d = 0.80. 
There was also a significant sex x rumination interaction, F(1, 331) = 5.85, p < .05. 
The interaction between sex and rumination is presented in Figure 2. There were no 
sex differences in aggression for participants who ruminated, t(176) _ -0.11, p > .05, 
d = -0.03. For distracted participants, males were more aggressive than females, 
t(167) = 3.35 , p < .001, d = 0.52. Sex did not interact with trigger or provocation, ps 
> .05. 
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Figure 2. Interaction between participant sex and rumination on hot sauce allocation. 
Capped vertical bars denote one standard error. 
Main effects and interactions. The analysis revealed significant main effects 
for provocation and trigger, Fs{1, 331) = 8.12 and 8.67 respectively, ps < .05. 
Moreover, therE; was also a significant rumination x triggering event interaction, F{1, 
331) = 4.01, p <~ .05. However, the main effects and interaction were qualified by the 
predicted provocation x rumination x triggering event interaction, F(1, 331) = 4.12, p 
< .05. In order to discern the nature of the interaction, the two-way interactions 
between rumination and triggering event were examined separately for provoked 
and nonprovoked participants. For provoked participants, the rumination x triggering 
event interaction was significant, F(1, 161) = 7.46, p < .01. As shown in Figure 3, in 
the presence oi' a minor triggering event, participants allocated more hot sauce if 
they ruminated than if they were distracted, t(75) = 3.21. p < .01, d = 0.68. In the 
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Yes 
Trigger 
Rumination 
® Distraction 
Figure 3. Effect`s of triggering event and rumination on hot sauce allocation after an 
initial provocation. Capped vertical bars denote one standard error. 
absence of a triggering event, there was no differences in hot sauce allocation 
between participants who ruminated and participants who were distracted, t(86) _ - 
0.56, p > .05, d' _ -0.13. 
In the ak~sence of an initial provocation, the two-way interaction between 
rumination and triggering event was not significant, F(1, 17$) = 0.07, p > .05. As 
shown in Figure 4, participants who ruminated and participants who were distracted 
did not differ in how much hot sauce they allocated to their partner, regardless of 
whether there ~Nas or was not a minor triggering event, t(83) _ -0.20, p > .05, d = - 
0.04 and t(95) ~_ -0.59, p > .05, d = -0.14, respectively, 
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Figure 4. Effects of triggering event and rumination on hot sauce allocation without 
an initial provocation. Capped vertical bars denote one standard error. 
Mediation Analyses 
Negative perceptions of the triggering event were hypothesized to mediate 
the relationship between triggering event and displaced aggression among provoked 
participants who ruminated. (i.e., the provocation-rumination condition). For the three 
other conditions (provocation-distraction, no provocation-rumination, and no 
provocation-distraction), no mediation was hypothesized. Mediation analyses were 
conducted to test these hypotheses using the LISREL 8.52 computer program 
(Joreskog & Sorbom, 2002). Table 3 presents the variance-covariance matrices 
used for analyses. 
For participants in the provocation-rumination condition, a causal path was 
specified linking trigger (a dichotomous, present or absent, variable) to perception of 
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Table 3. Variance-covariance matrices used for LISREL mediation analyses. 
Variances are on the diagonal, and covariances are below the diagonal. 
Measure 1 2 3 
Provocation -Rumination (N = 77) 
1. Trigger 0.25 
2. Evaluation 1.28 23.01 
3. Aggression 0.78 7.53 18.36 
Provocation -Distraction (N = 83) 
1. Trigger. 0.25 
2. Evaluation 0.83 14.67 
3. Aggression 0.15 1.42 8.15 
No Provocation -Rumination (N = 87) 
1. Trigger 0.25 
2. Evaluation 0.59 14.60 
3. Aggression 0.17 1.49 9.36 
No Provocation-Distraction (N = 90) 
1. Trigger 0.25 
2. Evaluation 1.06 15.44 
3. Aggression 0.09 0.41 13.77 
the evaluation. A second causal path was specified linking perception of the 
evaluation to aggression. For participants in the other three conditions, a causal ath 
p 
was specified linking trigger to perception of the evaluation. However, the causal 
r ` t 
path between perception of the evaluation and aggression was set to 0. It was 
hypothesized that, regardless of condition, a mildly negative trigger should be 
interpreted more negatively than a neutral evaluation. Thus, it was allowed to be a 
causal path for all conditions. The proposed model demonstrated a good fit to the 
data, x2(7, N = 337) = 7.19, p > .05, goodness of fit index = .97, comparative fix. 
index = 1.00, root mean square error of 0.14. For participants in the provocation-
rumination condition. The causal path between trigger and perception of the 
evaluation was positive and significant, z = 5.48, p < .05. Also, the casual path 
between perception of the evaluation and aggression was positive and significant, z 
= 3.44, p < .05. These results suggest that, for provoked participants who ruminate, 
a minor triggering event produces a negative perception of the triggering event, 
which, in turn, prompts increased displaced aggression. 
Triggering 
Event 
.53* 
Perception of 
Evaluation 
.37* 
Displaced 
Aggression 
Figure 5. Perception of trigger negativity as a mediator between trigger and 
displaced aggression for provoked participants who ruminated. *p < .05 
For the other conditions, the causal paths between trigger and perception of 
the evaluation were positive and significant. To examine the effect of constraining 
the causal paths between perception of the evaluation and aggression to 0 for the 
other conditions, another model was run where these paths were allowed to vary. 
Allowing the path to vary did not significantly improve the fit of the model over the 
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hypothesized model, x2(3, N = 337) = 2.87, p > .05. Moreover, the casual paths 
between perception of the evaluation and displaced aggression were not significant, 
ps > .05 (see Figures 6-8). This suggests that perceptions of the trigger and 
aggression are not related to each other in the other conditions. 
Triggering 
Event 
.44* 
Perception of 
Evaluation 
.13 
Displaced 
Aggression 
Figure 6. Perception of trigger negativity as a mediator between trigger and 
displaced aggression for provoked participants who were distracted. *p < .05 
Triggering 
Event 
.31 
Perception of 
Evaluation 
.13 
Displaced 
Aggression 
Figure 7. Perception of trigger negativity as a mediator between trigger and 
displaced aggression for nonprovoked participants who ruminated. *p < .05 
Triggering 
Event 
.54* 
Perception of 
Eva,luatron 
.03 
Displaced 
Aggression 
Figure 8. Perception of trigger negativity as a mediator between trigger and 
displaced aggression for nonprovoked participants who were distracted. *p < .05 
The results of the mediation analyses provide support for the hypothesized 
model. However, for provoked participants who ruminated, it is possible that the 
triggering event had a direct effect on displaced aggression. Thus, the hypothesized 
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model was modified by adding a direct casual path between trigger and displaced 
aggression, and treating that path as a free parameter. The inclusion of this path, 
however did not si nificantl im rove the fit of the model 2 3 N = 77 = 3.41 > g Y p ~x( ~ ) ~p 
05. Moreover, the direct path between trigger and displaced aggression was not 
significant, z = 1.87, p < .05. The full model is presented in .Figure 9. 
Triggering 
Event 
.46* 
Perception of 
Evaluation 
.37* 
Displaced 
Aggression 
.19 
Figure 9. Perception of trigger negativity as a mediator between trigger and 
displaced aggression for provoked participants who ruminated. *p < .05 
Finally, the mediation observed among participants in the provocation-
rumination condition can be explored by examining the indirect effects estimate. The 
indirect effects estimate and significance test are based on Sobel's (1982) method, 
which divides the indirect effects estimate by the standard error, and compares that 
value to a standard normal distribution. However, MacKinnon et al., (2002) argues 
that the significance test has low statistical power. They recommend using a 
modified distribution, z' for comparison, rather than a standard normal distribution. 
For the hypothesized model, the indirect effect of trigger on displaced aggression, 
via evaluation perception, was significant, ~i =.20,.z'= 2.91, p < .05. Moreover, even 
after the direct casual path between trigger and displaced was added to the model, 
the indirect effect remained significant, ~i=.17, z' = 2.97, p < .05. Thus, in summary, 
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the results of the mediation analyses suggest that, for provoked participants who 
ruminated, the effect of a triggering event on displaced aggression is mediated by 
the negative perception of the triggering event. 
~~ 
o~scussioN 
The purpose of the current study was to examine whether ruminating about a 
provocation increases displaced aggression against individuals who are mildly 
annoying. Participants were either provoked by an insulting experimenter, or not 
provoked by a pleasant experimenter. Participants then ruminated by writing about 
their experiences as a research participant, or were distracted by writing about the 
layout of the campus. Half of the participants received a mildly negative evaluation of 
their performance on an anagram task (trigger), whereas the other half received a 
neutral evaluation (no trigger). All participants were then given the opportunity 
engage in displaced aggression by deciding how much hot sauce their partner 
should receive, even though they knew that their partner hated spicy food. 
Provoked participants who ruminated were expected in engage in more 
displaced aggression in the presence of a minor triggering event than in the absence 
of one. The presence or absence of a triggering event was not expected to have 
differential effects on displaced aggression for provoked participants who were 
distracted, and nonprovoked participants. The results supported the hypothesis for a 
predicted three-way interaction between initial provocation, rumination, and 
triggering event. Specifically, provoked participants who ruminated were more 
aggressive in the presence of a minor triggering event than in the absence of one. 
However, for provoked participants who were distracted, the presence or absence of 
a minor triggering event had no effect on displaced aggression. For unprovoked 
participants, neither rumination nor triggering event had an effect on displaced. 
aggression. 
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The results of the current study lend support to the hypothesis that two 
antecedent conditions, a strong initial provocation and a minor triggering event, are 
necessary in order to observe displaced aggression effects (viz. Pederson et al., 
2000). Miller and Marcus-Newhall (1997) define this type of interaction as a 
disjunctively augmented response. That is, the combination of a strong initial 
provocation coupled with minor triggering event produces an aggressive response 
directed towards the triggering target that is excessive based on the intensity of the 
triggering event. Indeed, in the current study, under conditions of no provocation, the 
presence or absence of a triggering event had no significant effect on aggressive 
behavior, t(179) = 0.98, p > .05, d = 0.14. This suggests that the triggering. event, in 
itself, is indeed minor, and not severe enough to warrant an aggressive retaliation, 
which replicates findings from other studies of triggered displaced aggression 
(Bushman et al., 2003; Pedersen et al., 2000). 
Rumination has been hypothesized to moderate triggered displaced 
aggression effects (Pederson et al., 2000; Bushman et al., 2003). That is, activities 
that remind the individuals about the initial provocation, or the negative feelings 
associated with that provocation, should increase the likelihood of triggered 
displaced aggression effects. Such activities could be external (e.g., seeing the 
provoking individual at a later time), or internal, such as rumination. Ruminating, or 
thinking about the initial provocation or the negative feelings associated with that 
provocation, could maintain a cognitive state that disposes individuals to interpret 
ambiguous provocations negatively, and warranting of an aggressive retaliation. In 
contrast, activities. that distract the individual from thinking about the provocation, or 
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negative feelings associated with that provocation, should reduce the likelihood of 
displaced aggression. The results of the current study support the rumination 
hypothesis. Among provoked participants, those who ruminated about the 
provocation were more aggressive towards a triggering target than were individuals 
who were distracted from thinking about the initial provocation. Indeed, being 
distracted from thinking about the provocation appears to negate the effects of an 
initial provocation. That is, like unprovoked participants, the. presence or absence of 
a triggering event has no significant effect on displaced aggression, t(85) = 0.09, p > 
.05, d = 0.02. 
The results of the current study replicate the results presented in the 
Bushman et al. (2003) studies. In the Bushman et al. (2003) studies, the claim was 
made that rumination produces a cognitive state that disposes individuals to behave 
aggressively. Specifically, provoked individuals who ruminate are disposed to 
interpret .minor triggering events as provoking, or at least more provoking than they 
normally would be interpreted. However, Bushman et al. (2003} presented no 
mediational support for this assertion. In the current study, perceptions of the 
triggering event was added as a potential mediating variable, and mediational 
support was found. For provoked participants who ruminated, the perception of how 
negative the triggering event was mediated the relationship between the triggering 
event and displaced aggression. They interpreted the minor triggering event 
negatively (e.g., anger provoking, harsh, and overly critical), and this negative 
interpretation, in turn, prompted an aggressive retaliation. 
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One might hypothesize that it was the triggering event, not rumination, that 
prompted displaced aggression. However, there is evidence to refute that notion. 
First, under conditions of no provocation, the presence or absence of a triggering 
event had no effect on displaced aggression, which suggests that the triggering 
event in itself is not enough to prompt an aggressive retaliation under normal 
circumstances. This conclusion is also supported by mediational analyses. For 
nonprovoked participants, the presence of a minor triggering event was associated 
with a more negative perception of the trigger. Regardless of provocation, a minor 
triggering event should be interpreted somewhat more negatively that a neutral 
event. However, for nonprovoked participants, this negative perception of the 
triggering event was not enough to prompt an aggressive retaliation. Thus, if 
individuals are not initially angered, a minor triggering event is not perceived as 
aversive enough to warrant an aggressive retaliation. 
The results from the provoked-distracted participants also refutes the notion 
that displaced aggression is simply a function of a mildly aversive triggering event. 
Distracted participants behaved much like unprovoked participants. First, the 
presence or absence of a minor triggering event had no effect on displaced 
aggression among provoked participants who were distracted from .thinking about 
the provocation. Second, the results of the mediational analysis parallel the results 
found for nonprovoked participants. Though provoked-distracted participants 
interpreted a minor triggering event negatively, the negative interpretation was not 
sufficient enough to prompt aggressive behavior. 
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A Theoretical Explanation for Rumination Effects 
Often times, excitation transfer theory is used as an explanation for triggered 
displaced aggression effects. That is, arousal generated by a Time 1 event is 
misattributed to a Time 2 provocation, thus eliciting an aggression response 
(Zillmann 19.72, 1979). For example, an arousing Time 1 activity, such as an erotic 
film or strenuous exercise, is paired with a Time 2 provocation. In such studies, there 
is greater aggression if participants engaged in an arousing activity initially than if 
they did not (e.g., Cantor, Zillmann, & Einsiedel, 1978; Zillmann, Katcher, & 
Milaysky, 1972). Similarly, an excitation transfer explanation could be applied to the 
current study. Physiological arousal was initially generated by the insulting 
experimenter; and later, the source of that arousal was transferred to the minor 
triggering event, thus providing the justification for an aggressive retaliation. 
Though excitation transfer theory could explain the triggered displaced 
aggression effects observed in the current study, it seems incomplete. Aggression is 
a multifaceted phenomenon, and using misattributed arousal alone downplays other. 
dimensions of aggression, such as anger and aggressive cognitions. Moreover, 
research suggests physiological arousal generated by an initial activity, such as 
exercising or watching erotic films, lingers for at most 15 minutes (Doob &Clime, 
1972; Fridhandler & Averill, 1982; Tyson, 1998). Even if misattributed physiologica! 
arousal alone was responsible for the displaced aggression effects observed in this 
study, some process would have to maintain or reinstate the arousal after the 
lengthy delay (20 minutes) between the initial provocation and the displaced 
aggression opportunity. 
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A broader model of aggression, namely the General Aggression Model (GAM; 
Anderson &Bushman, 2002a), provides a theoretical framework for understanding 
both short- and long-term triggered displaced aggression effects. An initial 
.provocation is a situational input that creates an internal state of increased 
physiological arousal, aggressive affect, and aggressive cognitions. If an individual 
encounters ambiguously provocative behavior shortly after the initial provocation, the 
individual is primed to behave aggressively. That is, they are aroused, angry, and 
thinking aggressive thoughts, and thus, disposed to interpret behavior as hostile and 
deserving of an aggressive retaliation. 
GAM (Anderson &Bushman, 2002a) can explain the effect rumination has on 
displaced aggression, especially aggression that occurs. long after the initial 
provocation. Again, an initial provocation creates an aggressive internal state. If an 
individual ruminates about the provocation, they are maintaining this aggressive 
state. However, ruminating about the initial provocation could keep individuals angry, 
and thinking aggression related thoughts. Moreover, it is possible that rumination 
could maintain heightened physiological arousal- generated by the initial provocation, 
or possibly reinstate it at a later time. Therefore, when provoked at a substantially 
later time, the individual is still in an aggressive state, feeling angry and possibly 
aroused, thinking aggressive thoughts, and thus is primed to behave aggressively. 
The results of the current study suggest that rumination affects appraisal and 
decision making processes. Rumination was hypothesized to affect triggered 
displaced aggression by priming individuals to interpret the triggering event more 
negatively than warranted. Indeed, the results of the mediation analyses suggest 
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that provoked participants who ruminated interpreted the minor triggering event 
negatively, which, in turn, prompted displaced aggression. Because minor triggering 
events are often ambiguous with respect to intentionality, individuals must decide if 
the triggering behavior was provoking or not. Rumination appears to prime 
individuals to interpret triggering behaviors as provoking enough to warrant an 
aggressive retaliation. One possibility is that rumination disposes .individuals to a 
hostile perception bias, which has been linked to aggressive behavior (e.g., Crick & 
Dodge, 1994; Dill et. al, 1997). 
The tenants of GAM can also be used to identify means to prevent triggered 
displaced aggression. The results of the current study suggest that provoked 
participants who are distracted from thinking about the provocation behave similarity 
to individuals who were not provoked. That is, distracted. individuals are not disposed 
to interpret minor trigger events as provoking enough to warrant an aggressive 
response. Therefore, distracting oneself from thinking about a provocation appears 
to reduce the aggressive internal state generated by the initial provocation. This 
allows individuals to perceive minor triggering events as trivial, and not sufficiently. 
provoking to warrant an aggressive retaliation. Therefore, when provoked, 
individuals would be wise to engage in activities that prevent them from ruminating 
(e.g., focusing attention on awork-related project, reading a book). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Though the current study provides insights into a cognitive mechanism, 
namely rumination, that might underlie triggered displaced aggression, it is still not 
without limitations. First, some may question whether displaced aggression can be 
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accurately studied in laboratory settings. For example, does allocating hot sauce to 
an unknown partner really parallel yelling or hitting another person? However, both 
meta-analytic work and results from laboratory studies suggest that laboratory 
measures of aggression do assesses the same underlying construct (Carlson, 
Marcus-Newhall, &Miller, 1989),. and results derived from laboratory studies do 
parallel findings from "real life" studies of aggression (Anderson &Bushman, 1997). 
One criticism of excitation transfer explanations of displaced aggression is 
that physiological arousal generated by an initial Time 1 provocation cannot, in itself, 
persist over an extended period of time, namely longer than 15 minutes. Therefore, if 
misattributed arousal is a factor in displaced aggression, it must either be maintained 
or reinstated. It is possible that ruminating about a provocation could maintain or 
reinstate arousal generated by a Time 1 provocation. However, in order to test such 
a supposition, measures of physiological arousal should be incorporated into the 
experimental design. In order to discern if rumination maintains arousal, or reinstates 
it later, multiple readings should be taken before and after the initial provocation, 
during the rumination period, and after the triggering event. 
The results of the mediation analyses suggest that negative perceptions of 
the triggering event mediate the relationship between trigger and displaced 
aggression among provoked participants who ruminated. However, there might be 
other potential mediators that could account for this relationship, which should be 
explored. For example, GAM (Anderson & Bushman, 2002x) suggests that an 
aggressive internal state is comprised of arousal, affective, and cognitive factors. 
~4 
Various affective and cognitive variables that could served as mediators include 
aggressive or negative affect, or aggressive cognitions. 
Finally, potential moderating variables should also be examined. For 
example, the strength of the provocation could be a moderator; stronger 
provocations might elicit more rumination which, in turn, prompts greater displaced 
aggression than weaker provocations. Finally, certain personological factors should 
also be considered. There is considerable evidence suggesting that some 
individuals are more prone to rumination than others, and in turn, more likely to 
behave aggressively (e.g., Caprara, 1986; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Colombo, Politi, ~ 
Valerio, 1985; Caprara et al., 1992; Caprara, Cinanni, & Mazzotti, 1989; Caprara, 
Gargaro, Pastorelli, & Prezza, 1987; Caprara, Mazzotti, Zelli, Coluzzi, &Renzi, 
1985; Collins & 6ell, 1992). However, no studies to date have examined how 
dispositional rumination is related to triggered displaced aggression. For example, 
one might hypothesize that individuals already prone to rumination might show 
heightened displaced aggression when situationally induced to ruminate. 
Conclusion 
The current study is valuable because it suggests a cognitive mechanism, 
namely rumination, that can explain many instances of real life displaced 
aggression. The inclusion of a long temporal delay between a Time 1 provocation 
and a Time 2 triggering event is important in understanding displaced aggression 
effects that occur in -the real world. Certainly, at times, individuals are provoked by 
one person and have an immediate opportunity to lash out at someone else. 
However, this is not true of all displaced aggression situations. Often times, minor 
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triggering events occur long after the initial provocation, even hours later. 
Rumination appears to maintain a negative internal state that primes individuals to 
perceive minor annoyances negatively and engage in displaced aggression, and 
these rumination effects appear to persist over a long period of time. 
Individuals undoubtedly face many provocations that make them angry. 
However, how individuals focus their attention after these provocations affects how 
they will behave towards others. If individuals choose to think about the provocation, 
or focus on the bad mood it put them in, they may unfairly lash out against innocent 
others. If, instead, they chose to not think about the provocation, focus elsewhere, 
and let their anger dissipate, they are less likely to hurt others. Thus, if angered. by a 
tyrannical boss or an insulting professor, rather than thinking about the insults just 
yielded, perhaps individuals should think about what they want for lunch. 
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